Introduction
The relationship between competition and investment is a long lasting debate in industrial organization. However, no clear overall conclusions have been reached so far. Theoretically, Schmutzler (2013) showed that the relationship can go in any direction. Those di¤erent shapes depend on the characteristics of the industry. Many parameters may matter: Market structure, type of competition, consumers demand, cost patterns and technical progress. To my knowledge, the speci…c in ‡uence of the latter parameter of technical progress on this relation has not been thoroughly studied, despite the essential role of technical progress for dynamic e¢ ciencies and for economic growth.
This paper attempts to …ll the gap, focusing on the impact of technical progress on the relationship between competition and investment. In the paper, Orange, francois.jeanjean@orange.com 1 technical progress is understood as a technological opportunity in cost reducing innovation (process innovation) or quality improving innovation (product innovation), and competition can be measured either by the number of competitors or by the degree of product substitutability.
Using a simple oligopoly model of price competition, as in Motta and Tarantino (2017) , it is shown that a higher level of technical progress reduces the degree of competition (number of competitors or degree of product substitutability) that maximizes investment at the industry level. As a result, industries experiencing a low technical progress are more likely to exhibit an increasing shaped relationship between competition and investment while industries experiencing a higher technical progress are more likely to exhibit an inverted-U or a decreasing one. The higher the technical progress, the lower the number of competitors or the degree of product substitutability corresponding to the maximum investment.
More precisely, this paper shows that, on the one hand, in a symmetric market, a higher degree of technical progress reduces the number of …rms for which the investment at industry level is maximised and, on the other hand, in an asymmetric market, technical progress reduces the degree of substitutability for which the level of investment is maximum at industry level.
More precisely, I show that technical progress is a kind of competition in the sense that an increase in technical progress reallocates output from less e¢ cient …rms to most e¢ cient ones, which is, according to Boone (2008) , a general feature of more intense competition. This means that technical progress is actually a form of competition, a dynamic form of competition. Since a rise in technical progress increases competition, it is not surprising that the other kinds of competition, the static forms of competition, as the number of …rms or the degree of substitutability have to decrease to maintain the optimal level of competition that maximizes investment.
To illustrate the results, this paper provides parametric examples using demand functions in the manner of Shubik and Levithan (1980) or Singh and Vives (1984) .
The following of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 is a literature review, section 3 describes a general model of price competition with investment. Section 4 derives this model for symmetric markets in order to study the impact of technological opportunity on the number of …rms and shows that the maximum investment occurs for a lower number of …rms when the technological opportunity increases. Section 5 shows that the decrease in the level of competition maximizing investment with technical progress still holds when competition is measured as the degree of substitutability and Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
The economic literature about the relationship between competition and investment (or innovation) is already quite developped and started a long time ago. Insofar as innovation requires investment, we can consider in the rest of the pa-per that the incentives to innovate and the incentives to invest in cost reduction or in quality improvement go hand in hand.
Schumpeter (1942) insisted on the ability of large …rms to innovate which suggests that concentration fosters innovation and thus competition hampers it. Arrow (1962) showed that competition tends to foster innovation because …rms in competition have more incentives to innovate than a monopolist whose innovation sould cannibalize the pro…t. However, Gilbert and Newberry (1982) highlighted that a monopolist could have more incentives to innovate than a …rm under competition. Indeed, a monopolist loses more than a …rm under competition by not investing in innovation because the rent of a monopoly is higher than the joint pro…t of a duopoly.
Aghion et al (2005) reconcile those two views. They distinguish between two e¤ects, the "scumpeterian e¤ect", where competition reduces investment incentives and "escape competition e¤ect" where competition fosters investment. They show that the relationship between competition and investment is governed by those two opposing e¤ects and …nally they found an inverted U relationship for United Kingdom economy.
More precisely, Aghion et al (2014) developed a model that details the mecanism of the two e¤ects. In the escape competition e¤ect, competition reduces the pre innovation pro…t, which fosters innovation while in the schumpeterian e¤ect, competition decreases rather the post innovation pro…t which impacts adversely innovation. In their model, both e¤ects coexist. The escape competition e¤ect is represented by symmetric duopolies engaged in a neck to neck competition, both competitors using the same technology. Schumpeterian e¤ect is represented by asymmetric duopolies with a leader and an outsider. The leader exerts a monopoly power because it uses a higher level of technology and the follower sells nothing but is willing to innovate to catch up with the leader. When a competitor innovates, in the symmetric competition, it acquires a monopoly power and the duopoly becomes asymmetric and then represents, the shumpeterian e¤ect. When the outsider innovates in the asymmetric duopoly, it catches up with the leader and the duopoly becomes symmetric and then represents the escape competition e¤ect. Duopolies thus go back and forth between the symmetrical and asymmetrical form. When the symmetrical form prevails, escape competition e¤ect dominates and the global e¤ect is that competition fosters innovation. When the asymmetrical form prevails, schumpeterian e¤ect dominates and the global e¤ect is that competition hampers innovation. Aghion et al showed that an increase in competition intensity tends to destabilize the symmetrical form and thus fosters the asymmetrical form. As a result, an increase in competition intensity tends to decrease the slope of the competition innovation curve. A low intensity of competition is more likely to provide a increasing slope while a high intensity of competition is more likely to provide a decreasing one.
This model is particularly usefull for this paper to understand the role of technical progress. Indeed, technical progress or the size of innovation impacts the post-innovation pro…t rather than the pre-innovation pro…t. Therefore, a higher size of innovation, which means a higher technical progress, increases the shumpeterian e¤ect in the asymmetrical duopolies and does not impact the escape competition e¤ect. As a result, a higher size of innovation reduces the slope of the competition-innovation relationship and thereby, the level of competition that maximizes investment. It is noteworthy that technical progress, exactly like competition tends to decrease the slope of the competition-innovation relationship. Finally, this is not surprising if technical progress is a form of competition. Schmutzler (2013) noticed that the relationship between competition and investment could take any shape, increasing decreasing, U shaped or inverted U shaped. Indeed, this depends on the relative in ‡uences of shumpeterian and escape competition e¤ect.
For symmetric markets, Vives (2008) presents a benchmaking analysis of di¤erent models in which several examples point out that an increase in technological opportunity leads to more concentrated markets in free entry regime which means that technological progress reduces the number of …rms so that competition is sustainable. This may seem counterintuitive, a higher technological opportunity should increase total output and attract more …rms, but Tandon (1984) explains this apparent paradox by the fact that technological opportunity entails more investment in cost reduction that act as entry barriers. The latter e¤ect outweighs the …rst. This increased investment due to technological opportunity, in some way, strengthens the Schumpeterian e¤ect more than the escape competition e¤ect. This is consistent with empirical …nd-ings of Kamien and Schwartz (1982) or Scherer and Ross (1990) . Jeanjean and Houngbonon (2017) empirically showed that for the mobile telecommunication markets, characterized by a high level of technical progress, investment per …rm decreases with the number of …rms and investment of the industry is ambiguous (it tends to increase in the short run but eventually falls in the long run). They also noticed the increasing impact of asymmetry on investment.
The literature on technological di¤usion is also usefull to understand the relationship between competition and innovation. In this literature, a new technology is announced. The cost of adoption is supposed to decrease over time, …rms choose when to adopt. The earlier they adopt, the earlier they bene…t from the new technology but the higher is the adoption cost. The adoption date is a trade-o¤ between growth of pro…t and cost of adoption. Reinganum (1981) shows that …rms adopt at di¤erent times even if they are initially identical. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) studied the case where …rms attempt to preempt innovation because the leader earns more than the follower. In that case, there is still a leader and a follower, but they earn the same actualized value. In both cases, Jeanjean (2017) investigated the impact of technical progress on the technological adoption. The higher the technical progress, the larger the size of innovation at equal cost of adoption or the lower the cost of adoption for an equal size of innovation. The higher the technical progress, the earlier the …rms adopt in average. However, there is a limit because …rms can not adopt before the innovation is performed. Technical progress, stimulating the impact of competitive pressure tends to advance the date of adoption of the leader and to delay that of the follower with a positive overall e¤ect on the investment of the industry because the former e¤ect is larger than the latter. However, the limit stops this dynamic. Beyond the degree of substitutability where the leader adopts immediately, an increase in competitive pressure can no longer advance the adoption of the leader but still delay that of the follower. As a result, investment of the industry decreases. Technical progress increases competition and thus reduces the degree of substitutability for which this occurs.
Furthermore, …nancial constraints may also impede to achieve the investment required by the "Escape competition e¤ect" as noticed by Houngbonon & Jeanjean (2016) .
The model
In this section, we consider, as in Motta and Tarentino (2017) , a model of oligopoly with di¤erentiated goods where N …rms compete in price. Demand for the good produced by …rm i is given by q i (p i ; p i ) where p i is the price of …rm i and p i , the vector of price of the N 1 …rms di¤erent from …rm i.
Firms set simultaneously their price and their cost reducing investment. …rm i set price p i and cost reducing investment x i to maximize its pro…t i . The cost of investment is denoted by F (x i ) where F is increasing and convex Pro…t of …rm i writes:
The solution of the maximization problem leads to two …rst-order conditions, one for the price and the other for the investment:
The assumption of simultaneous choice guarantee that Investment of …rm i; x i is independent of competitors'investment, as a result, x i increases with q i : c i depends only on x i and c 0i ; the marginal cost of …rm i without investment. x i depends only on q i and the technical progress, : q i depends only on p i and p i according to demand function. Yet p i depend on c i and the marginal cost of the rivals c i : As a result, given the demand function and the level of technical progress, all the variables: prices, outputs, marginal costs, investments and pro…ts depend only on the initial marginal costs of the …rms c 0i .
A …rm with no output is excluded from the market. This means that the number of …rms tends to decrease for a higher degree of substitutability.
An increase in technical progress entails an increase in investment x i which decreases marginal cost c i : Technical progress, thus improves …rms e¢ ciency. More e¢ cient …rms tends to decrease prices while increasing the price cost margin and the output.
3.1 Technical progress can be considered as a form of competition.
Proposition 1 Technical progress reallocates output from less e¢ cient …rms to most e¢ cient ones. In other words, it increases market share of most e¢ cient …rms at the expense of the less e¢ cient ones.
Proof. The growth of e¢ ciency involved by technical progress is all the higher as the …rm is already e¢ cient, wich means that di¤erences in e¢ ciency among …rms increase with technical progress and thus, the di¤erences in output accelerate. As a result, if …rm i is strictely more e¢ cient than …rm j; then the ratio : Average e¢ ciency is
(@q i =@ ) ; thus if …rm i is more e¢ cient than the average, then @qi=@ qi
An increase in technical progress yields
This ratio is positive because the numerator and the denominator are both positive. This means that an increase in technical progress increases the market share of the most e¢ cient …rms to the expense of the less e¢ cient ones. As more e¢ cient …rms have already a larger market share, technical progress increases the market share of …rms all the more they have already a large one.
As mentionned by Boone (2008) the output reallocation e¤ect is a general feature of more intense competition. As aconsequence, technical progress can be considered as an actual form of competition. This is a dynamic form of competition that is involved by investment while the number of …rms or the degree of substitutability are considered as static form of competition.
It is therefore not surprising, insofar as there is an optimal level of competition which maximizes investment, that technical progress as a dynamic form of competition tends to replace the static form of competition to achieve this optimal level of competition consisting of the static and dynamic forms of competition.
Parametric model
To illustrate the impact of technological opportunity on investment, I choose a parametric model for which c i (x i ) = c 0i x i and F (x i ) = x 2 i =2 : The higher ; the parameter representing technical progress, the less expensive the investment for a given impact on marginal cost x i . I choose the traditional utility function from Shubik and Levitan (1980) .
where i > 0 and 2 (0; 1) represents the product substitutability. = 0 means product are independent and …rms act as monopolists and = 1 means product are perfect substitutes.
Maximization of consumer utility leads to:
And …nally, …rm i's demand is given by:
The general expression of q i function of initial marginal costs can be derived using equations (2), (3) and (7):
As an alternative, we can use the Singh and Vives (1984) demand function (in the appendix).
We can check, with the parametrical model that technical progress reallocates output from less e¢ cient …rms to most e¢ cient ones. Indeed, technical 7 progress increases the market share of …rms with above average e¢ ciency and decreases the market share of …rms with below average e¢ ciency. Denoting
(see proof in the annexes) In the next sections 3 and 4, I will respectively study how the general model applies in the symmetric case, where the intensity of competition derives from the number of identical competitors, and in the asymmetric case where the intensity of competition derives from the degree of substituability that a¤ects di¤erently the competitors having di¤erent e¢ ciencies.
Symmetrical market
In this part, we consider a symmetrical market with N …rms. In a symmetrical market,
Investment per …rm is F and investment of the industry is I(N ) = N F . We denote "; the elasticity of investment per …rm according to the number of …rms:
Number of …rms maximizing investment of the industry
The number of …rms maximizing investment of the industry is N max = arg max
which can be rewritten: N max = max 
" < "(N ) then there is an absolute maximum, N which is …nite and di¤ erent from 0 and N max is …nite, N max 1
Proof. Indeed, in that case, the …rst order condition @I @N = 0 and the second order condition
@N 2 < 0 are both ful…lled. N is a maximum. the conditions "(0) < "(N ) and lim N !+1 " < "(N ) ensure that if there is only one maximum this is a absolute maximum and if there are several maximum for di¤erent …nite values of N > 0; one of them is an absolute maximum. If N max is the unic absolute maximum, and N max > 1; the relationship between the number of …rms and the investment of the industry is inverted U shaped.
Otherwise three cases can occur: -First case: 9 N 2 R + such that " = 1,
" "(N ) . In that case, N is a relative but not an absolute maximum.
-Second case: 8 N 2 R + ; " < 1. In this case, @I @N < 0; investment of the industry always decreases with the number of …rms, thus, N = 0 and N max = 1: The investment of the industry is maximum under monopoly.
-Third case: 8 N 2 R + ; " > 1: In this case, @I @N > 0; investment of the industry always increases with the number of …rms, thus N and N max tends toward in…nity. The higher the number of …rms, the higher the investment of the industry.
Impact of technical progress on the relationship between the number of …rms and investment per …rm
Now, we are focusing on the impact of technical progress on the relationship between the number of …rms and investment per …rm F:
The impact of technical progress on the elasticity of investment according to the number of …rms is in the same sense as the impact of the number of …rms . In other words, sign 
Proposition 4 Technical progress tends to reduce the number of …rms that maximizes investment of the industry.
Proof. If N 2 R
+ is the number of …rms maximizing investment of the industry, then …rst order condition and second order condition are both ful…lled, "(N ) = 1 and In all cases, a higher technical progress maintain or decreases the number of …rms maximizing investment of the industry.
The graph below (…gure 4.2) represents the fall in the maximising number of …rms under a higher technical progress.
Fall in the maximising number of …rms 4.3 Impact on consumer surplus and Welfare:
As for investment, in symmetric market, consumer surplus or welfare at industry level equals N times the consumer surplus or the welfare brought by each …rm. we denote respectively CSI and W I; Consumer surplus and welfare at industry level. CSI = N CS and W I = N W . We denote, respectively the elasticities of consumer surplus and welfare according to the number of …rms: " CS = Lemma 5 If the impact of the number of …rms on consumer surplus is decreasing, then the impact of technical progress on the elasticity of consumer surplus according to the number of …rms is also decreasing . In other words: If
Proof. An increase in output induced by technical progress increases consumer surplus. If
The proof is the same as Lemma 1 replacing F by CS: However, the reverse is not necessarily true. If " CS > 0 then
is not necessarily positive. This is the di¤erence between consumer surplus and investment.
Proposition 6 Technical progress tends to reduce the number of …rms that maximizes consumer surplus and welfare.
Proof. The proof is the same as Proposition 1 replacing F by CS: Indeed, the proof uses only the sense If " < 0 then @" @ < 0 because the …rst order condition entails " = 1:
Welfare is the sum of Consumer surplus and pro…t. Pro…t is linked to output and, as a result, a decrease in pro…t following an increase in the number of …rms implies a decrease in output. As a result, a decrease in welfare implies a decrease in output. If @W @N < 0 then @q @N < 0: Using the same reasonning than for consumer surplus leads to a similar conclusion: If
Impact of technical progress in the parametric model:
We derive the expression of demand per …rm in the symmetric case from equation (8), (results for Singh & Vives demand function are in the annexes), using the fact that 8i; j i = j = and c oi = c oj 1 :
Equation (3) yields x = q, equation (7) 1 There is a constraints on the value of marginal cost which can not be negative, thus x c 0 . A higher allows to choose a higher c 0 with a constant e¢ ciency ( c 0 ). This reduces the constraint. color, the higher the technical progress. The graph shows that the maximum investment occurs for 5 …rms when = 0:8; for 4 …rms when = 1 and for 3 …rms, when = 1:2: We can see that, as expected, the number of …rm maximizing investment of the industry decreases with the number of …rms.
The graph below represents N max ; the number of …rm that maximizes investment according to di¤erent values of technical progress, and substitutability, :
N max decreases with technical progress
This graph shows how the number of …rm decreases with technical progress. Moreover, N max tends to fall with the degree of substitutability. It is not surprising as the degree of substitutability tends to increase static competition. For an equal level of technical progress, a higher degree of substitutability tends to decrease the other forms of static competition, the number of …rms.
Consumer Surplus and Welfare:
Consumer surplus at industry level can be calculated replacing p = (1 + (N 1)) q in equation (5):
At …rm level, for symmetric market, CSI(N ) = N CS(N ): Thus CS(N ) = F (N )(1+ (N 1)) :
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We can verify that if " CS < 0 then
is not necessarily positive (in the annexes). Consequently, an increase in technical progress tends to decrease the number of …rms maximizing consumer surplus.
Moreover, if N maximizes investment of the industry and N maximizes consumer surplus, then N N (in the annexes) Welfare is written W I(N ) = CSI(N ) + N (N ); using equations (10), (1), x = q and p = (1 + (N 1)) q we can write:
Or at …rm level: W = ( c 0 ) q + F CS The variation of welfare according to the number of …rms can be written:
with " q ; the elasticity of output according to the number of …rms " q = We can verify that technical progress tends to decrease the number of …rms maximizing welfare. Indeed, this number is lower than the one that maximizes consumer surplus and higher than the one that maximizes investment, (exepted for high and high for which the maximum welfare is achieved for monopoly. see in the annexes).
The graph below represents the evolution of Investment, Consumer surplus and welfare with technical progress at industry level:
Technical progress decreases the number of …rms maximizing I, CSI and WI The simulation is made with ( c 0 ) = 0:4: For = 0:2 and = 1:3; maximum investment is achieved for 3 …rms, maximum welfare for 6 …rms and maximum consumer surplus for more than 20 …rms. For = 0:2 and = 1:4; maximum investment is achieved for 2 …rms, maximum welfare for 4 …rms and maximum consumer surplus for 9 …rms. For = 0:2 and = 1:4; maximum investment is achieved for 2 …rms, maximum welfare for 3 …rms and maximum consumer surplus for 5 …rms. This shows that technical progress decreases the number of …rm that maximizes Investment of the industry, consumer surplus and welfare. For = 0:6 and = 1:4; maximum investment is achieved for 2 …rms, maximum welfare for 1 …rm and maximum consumer surplus for 2 …rms. This last example illustrates the fact that, for su¢ ciently high and ; it possible that maximum welfare is achieved for a monopoly while maximum investment is achieved for a duopoly.
Asymmetrical market
In this section, we allow …rms to have di¤erent e¢ ciency 9 i; j; i 6 = j such that c 0i 6 = c 0j : We consider in this section the competition as the friction among …rms regardless of the number of …rms, like the degree of substitutability.
We have seen in section 3 that competition, like technical progress increases the market share of the most e¢ cient …rms whose market share are above the average at the expense of the …rms whose market share are under the average. This increases investment of the most e¢ cient …rms but decreases the investment of the least e¢ cient ones. However, as function F (x) is increasing and convexe, the increase in investment of the most e¢ cient …rms is higher than the decline in investment of the least e¢ cient ones and as a result, investment of the industry increases.
Competition, like technical progress increases asymmetry and asymmetry increases the investment of the industry, thus competition increases investment of the industry as long as …rms have a positive market share. Indeed, there is a limit when the least e¢ cient …rm has no more output. In that case, an increase in competition beyond this limit implies the exit of the least e¢ cient …rm. This exits has a negative impact on competition and may reduce investment, but after the exit, the increase in competition still increase investment and entails another exit beyond a certain degree. Investment of the industry is higher for the second exit than for the …rst, because market is more asymmetric and output is more concentrated in the most e¢ -cient …rms. The growth of competition thus eliminates in turn all the …rms up to the most e¢ cient one, which remains alone. When the most e¢ cient …rm is alone, it seeks to avoid the return of the last eliminated competitor. However, the …ercer the competition, the more easy it is because competition tends to increase the di¤erences in e¢ ciency between …rms. As a result, the investment required to prevent the return of the competitor decreases with competition. This investment is the investment of the industry since the most e¢ cient …rm has a monopoly.
In summary, investment of the industry tends to increase with competition, even if it falls punctually at each exit, until the most e¢ cient …rm remains alone. Beyond this point, competition tends to decrease investment of the industry. There is thus an inverted U relationship between competition and investment. The degree of competition that maximizes investment of the industry is achieved at the point the second most e¢ cient …rm is about to exit.
An increase in technical progress, like competition ampli…es the di¤erences in e¢ ciency among …rms. As a result, exits occurs for a lower degree of competition under increased technical progress. The last exit also occurs for a lower degree of competition. This means that technical progress decreases the degree of competition that maximizes investment of the industry.
Impact on consumer surplus and Welfare:
The degree of substitutability that maximizes Consumer surplus and Welfare decreases with technical progress. As Investment, Consumer surplus and Welfare have a relative maximum for the degree of substitutability for which the less e¢ cient …rm is about to give up to. As a result, maximum Consumer Surplus and maximum Welfare are achieved for this degree of substitutability = or for = 0: An increase in technical progress decrease this degree and thus the degree of substitutability that maximizes Consumer Surplus and 16 welfare. However, the level of technical progress for which the shift between and 0 occurs is not necessarily the same.
Impact of technical progress in the parametric model:
Investment of the industry is:
To illustrate the impact of technical progress when the competitive pressure increases with the degree of substitutability, ; we use the parametric model de…ned above and, in this case, to simplify the analysis we choose N = 2: For simpli…cation, we denote E i = ( i c oi ), the e¢ ciency of …rm i: In that case, for Schubik and Levitan demand function, (results for Singh & Vives demand function are in the annexes), equation (8) in which N = 2; thus A = 1 provides demand for …rm i:
This expression is available as soon as the output of the less e¢ cient …rm is positive. The coe¢ cient of substitutability increases the competitive pressure and reduces the output of the less e¢ cient …rm. If …rm i is the most e¢ cient …rm and …rm j the less e¢ cient one, the output of …rm j is positive as soon as with:
We can notice that an increase in decreases : Denoting = qi qj 2 and q = qi+qj 2 , the average output. Investment of the industry, for can be written:
We can verify that when is close to ; then investment of the industry is increasing:
For higher values of ; > ; …rm j exits the market and …rm i ,alone, exerts a monopoly which increases price and decreases total output and thus investment at the industry level. However, if we consider that the monopoly is contestable, when output of …rm j equals zero, q j = 0, x j = 0, …rm j 0 s price is marginal cost, and marginal cost is initial marginal cost as …rm j does not invest any more: p j = c j = c oj :
When the monopoly is contestable, the notion of substitutability still make sense. In this case, the output of …rm i for the Schubik and Levitan demand function deduced from equation (6) is:
Output of …rm i decreases with the substitutability when
As a result,
@I @
> 0 and
There is a discontinuity in due to the exit of the least e¢ cient …rm and is a relative maximum of the investment of the industry.
is an absolute maximum if I ( ) > I (0) ; 0 is an absolute maximum if I ( ) < I (0) and 0 and are two equals relatives maximums if I ( ) = I (0)(proof in the annexes)
The graph below (5.1) represents the evolution of Investment at the industry level in function of substitutability for di¤erent level of technical progress for both demand functions when monopoly is contestable:
Technical progress decreases the degree of substitutability maximizing investment.
In this graph the e¢ ciency of …rms are: This graph shows that the degree of substitutability that maximizes investment of the industry decreases with technical progress. Each curve represents the evolution of the investment of the industry according to the degree of substitutability for a given level of technical progress. The darker the curves, the higher the technical progress, : In this example, the initial number of …rms is 4, and we can see that less e¢ cient …rms exit as the degree of substitutability increases. Exits are illustrated by falls in investment for the degree of substitutability that cause the exit. The fall is all the more sharp as the number of …rms decreases. In the left part, the demand function is Shubik & Levitan and in the right part, it is Singh and Vives demand function. We can observe that the degree of substitutability of the exits decrease with technical progress. It is also the case for the exit of the second most e¢ cient …rm which occurs for = : Indeed, we can notice, in equation (14) that is decreasing in : For the Singh & Vives demand function, the maximium investment of the industry is achieved for = which decreases with technical progress:For the Shubik & Levitan demand function, the maximum investment of the industry is achieved for = or for = 0 when is high enough.
We denote
Ej
; the value of technical progress such that I( ) = I (0) : As long as ; I( ) I(0) and if > then I( ) < I(0): In both case, an increase in technical progress reduces the degree of substitutability that maximizes investment.
In the case we consider that monopoly is not contestable 2 , the investment still decreases with the substitutability and, therefore, the maximum investment is still achieved for = :
The graph below (5.1), represents the degree of substitutability maximizing investment in function of technical progress for both demand functions.
Degree of substitutability maximizing Investment
The dotted black curve represents as a function of for Shubik & Levitan demand function and the full black curve represents the degree of substitutability maximizing investment as a function of still for Shubik & Levitan demand function: Both lines are mingled until and full line equals zero beyond. The 2 in that case, output of the monopolist, …rm i no longer depends on substitutability.
for Shubik and Levitan demand function and
full gray curve represents the degree of substitutability maximizing investment as a function of for Singh & Vives demand function. In both cases technical progress decreases the degree of substitutability maximizing investment. Consumer surplus and Welfare.
Consumer surplus can be calculated from equations (5) and (6) for N = 2 :
+ q i q j which yields after some manipulations:
which can be rewriten in a more compact form:
For
; consumer surplus is increasing close to ;
. It is obvious that CS ( ) is decreasing. is the absolute maximum and if > ; 0 is the absolute maximum.
Welfare is given by: W ( ) = 1 ( ) + 2 ( ) + CS ( ) ; which yields:
q i q j or after some manipulations:
For welfare is increasing close to ; We denote ; the level of technical progress such that if = then
is the absolute maximum and if > ; 0 is the absolute maximum. We can show that (proof in the annexes). This means that for < ; is the absolute maximum for investment of the industry, consumer surplus and welfare. For < < ; is the absolute maximum for investment of the industry and consumer surplus and 0 is the maximum for welfare. For > ; 0 is the absolute maximum for investment of the industry, consumer surplus and welfare.
6 Conclusion:
This paper shows that technical progress tends to reduce the degree of competition (measured as the number of …rms or as the degree of substitutability) that maximizes investment at the industry level, Consumer Surplus and Welfare.
Technical progress, understood as technological opportunity, act as a catalyst of competition. It reduces the cost of investment aiming to improve e¢ ciency. The highest the technological progress, the more …rms are encouraged to improve e¢ ciency and the more they invest. This race for investment is, in a way, a form of competition. As a result, when there is a level of competition that maximizes investment, an increase in the level of technical progress strenghtens competition and requires a reduction of the level of competition (number of competitors or substitutability) to keep the optimal level.
In the case of competition by the number of competitors, we have seen that investment of the industry occurs when the elasticity of investment per …rm according to the number of …rm is equal to -1. An increase in the level of technical progress makes investment per …rm more elastic and therefore, requires a reduction of the number of …rms to keep it at its optimal value of -1.
In the case of competition measured with the degree of substitutability in assymmetrical markets, competition increases the assymmetry between competitors. The degree of substitutability increases 3 investment of the industry until the less e¢ cient competitor is forced out of the market. The maximum investment is achieved for this degree of substitutability. An increase in the level of technical progress strenghtens competition and reduces the degree of substitutability for which the less e¢ cient …rm is forced out.
In both cases, the catalyst e¤ect of technical progress on competition entails a reduction of the degree of competition that maximizes investment of the industry.
Investment in e¢ ciency improvement 4 is a main driver of consumer surplus and welfare. As a result, technical progress also decreases the degree of competition that maximizes consumer surplus and welfare.
This property of technical progress has policy implications. In industries where the level of technical progress is high, like information technologies, telecommunications, biological or nanotehnological engineering, the degree of competition shoud be adjusted to a lower level than industries enjoying a lower level of technical progress in order to maximize investment, consumer surplus and welfare.
This paper highlights a theoretical point of view, a comparison of di¤erent industries enjoying di¤erent level of technological progress, would be usefull to empirically test this theory.
Annexes:
Proof of the output reallocation e¤ect in parametric model:
From equation 8, we can write the market share can be written:
The derivation yields: 
and 1. However, we know also that "(N ) = 1 and
Veri…cation that maximum welfare is achieved for a lower number of …rms than consumer surplus and a higher number of …rms than investment (exepted for high and/or high where maximum welfare is achieved for monopoly) remember A = 1 + (N 2) If N CS is the number of …rms maximizing consumer surplus of the industry, then " CS = 1; " = 1+ (2N CS 1) 1+ (N CS 1) and " q = 1+ (2N CS 1) 2(1+ (N CS 1)) ; for simpli…cation, we denote A CS = 1 + (N CS 2): Replacing those expressions in equation (12) yields, after some manipulations:
As the denominator is positive, this expression is negative if
1 A CS + 1 and we can verify that it is the case for all values of and ; because otherwise, if < (1 )
which is not possible because by assumption " CS = 1 therefore, @W I @N (N CS ) < 0 and denoting N w ; the number of …rms maximizing welfare, N w < N CS : As N CS decreases with technical progress, then N w also decreases with technical progress.
If N I is the number of …rms maximizing investment of the industry, then " = 1 and " q = 1=2: We denote A I = 1 + (N I 2) Replacing " = 1 in equation ( 12) (1+ (N I 2)) + 1 then N w < N I . However, this can only occur when N w < 2 which means that the maximum welfare is achieved for the monopoly. Proof that investment of the industry is increasing for when is close to We know that reallocates output from j to i as i is more e¢ cient, thus q i ( ) is increasing and thus Proof that consumer surplus is increasing for when is close to Using equation (15), q i = q + and q j = q ; q i q j = (q + ) (q ) = q 
We derive the general expression of q i function of initial marginal costs using equations (2), (3) and (19) : Assymmetric duopoly:
Output:
Maximum substitutability:
and for the Singh and Vives demand function deduced from equation (19) is:
